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raises an inference that
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evidence of nonexistence
the fact
uncontradicted and of such
nature
cannot
be
nonexistence of the
fact
established as a matter of law;
these circumstances
the inference
as a matter of
if the fact
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case, a nonsuit or directed verdict is proper.
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elicited
§
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(6] !d.-Examination of Adverse Party-Effect of Testimony.The provision in Code Civ. Proc., § 2055, that a party calling an
adverse witness shall not be bound by his testimony does not
mean that such testimony may not be given its proper weight,
but merely that the party calling such witness shall not be concluded from rebutting his testimony or from impeaching him.
[7a, 7b] !d.-Examination of Adverse Party-Effect of Testimony.
-An inference on which plaintiff relies may be completely dispelled as a matter of law by evidence given by adverse witnesses called under Code Civ. Proc., § 2055, provided the
evidence is clear, positive, uncontradicted and of such a nature
that it cannot rationally be disbelieved.
[8] Evidence-Presumptions-Operation and Effect.-A presumption is dispelled as a matter of law only when a fact which is
wholly irreconcilable with it is proved by uncontradicted
testimony of the party relying on it or of such party's own
witnesses.
[9] Witnesses-Examination of Adverse Party-Effect of Testimony.-A presumption favorable to plaintiff cannot be dispelled as a matter of law by testimony of defendant given
pursuant to Code Civ. Proc., § 2055, because a defendant called
under such section is not treated as plaintiff's witness; an
inference, on the other hand, may be dispelled as a matter of
law by evidence produced by either party.
[10] !d.-Examination of Adverse Party-Effect of Testimony.If evidence given by adverse witnesses called by plaintiff under Code Civ. Proc., § 2055, establishes as a matter of law that
one of several defendants in a malpractice case is free from
negligence, a prima facie case against such defendant based on
the inference of negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur should fall, and plaintiff's position with respect to
such defendant should be the same as if she had failed to
prove all facts necessary to raise the inference.
[11] !d.-Determination of Credibility-Disregarding Testimony.
-A witness may be disbelieved if there is any rational ground
for doing so, and the interest of a party in the result of a case
will in some circumstances justify the trier of fact in disregarding his testimony.
[12] Physicians-Malpractice--Res Ipsa Loquitur.-On defendant
surgeon's motion for nonsuit at the close of the ease of plaintiff
in whose abdomen a clamp had been left during an operation, in part of which he assisted, the inference of negligence
raised against him under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was
dispelled as a matter of law by the uncontradicted testimony
given by him and codefendant doctors when en lled as adversr
witnesses under Code Civ. Proc., § 20!55, to the effect that said
[6] See Cal.Jur., Witnesses, §50; Am.Jur., Witnesses, § 560.
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surgeon was not responsible for leaving the clamp in plaintiff's
abdomen, particularly where his exoneration had the necessary
effect of increasing the possibility of liability on the part of
all other defendants.
[13] Hospitals-Actions-Inferences.-In an action for damages
brought by plaintiff in whose abdomen a clamp had been left
during an operation, testimony of a hospital employee relied
on to dispel the inference of negligence on the part of a
surgical nurse and the hospital could be disbelieved by the
trier of fact where she had an interest in the outcome of the
case because of her relationship with the hospital and because
the hospital, as employer, would be liable for acts of the
nurse within the scope of employment.
[14] Id.-Actions-Inferences.-In an action for damages brought
by plaintiff in whose abdomen a clamp had been left during an
operation, a hospital employee's testimony, if accepted by the
trier of fact as true, was not of the character required to dispel the inference of negligence raised against the hospital
and a surgical nurse, where it would not conclusively establish
that the hospital and nurse were free from negligence.
[15] Evidence-Judicial Notice.-It is a matter of common knowledge that no special skill is required in counting instruments.
[16] Hospitals-Actions-Evidence.-With respect to liability of
a hospital and surgical nurse for injuries sustained by plaintiff as a result of a clamp being left in her abdomen during an
operation, proof of practice or custom employed by other
hospitals and nurses in the community is some evidence of
what should be done and may assist in determination of what
constitutes due care, but it does not conclusively establish the
standard of care.
[17] Usages and Customs-Usage as Affecting Negligence.-General negligence cannot be excused on the ground that others
in the same locality practice the same kind of negligence.
[18] Hospitals- Actions- Questions of Law and Fact.-In an
action for damages brought by plaintiff in whose abdomen a
clamp had been left during an operation, it could not be said
as a matter of law that there was no duty on the part of the
hospital and nurses to keep an instrument count in order to
assist the surgeon in determining whether all instruments
used had been removed from the patient before final closure.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Santa
Cruz County. James L. Atteridge, Judge. Affirmed in part
and reversed in part.
[17] See Cal.Jur., Usages and Customs, § 11; Am.Jur., Usages
and Customs, § 44.
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Code of
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of the
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The case against Lacy and Siegal was settled after the nonsuits were
granted as to the other defendants.
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cision from
which was
About 40 minutes after the operation was begun, Lacy
Eiskamp, who had been performing surgery in
of the
to look at plaintiff's gall bladder.
Eiskamp made a visual
and recommended that
the gall bladder be removed. After Eiskamp left the room,
Lacy and Slegal discovered a "mass" in the sigmoid colon,
which appeared to be cancerous. Lacy again consulted Eiskamp, ·who
that the mass should be removed and
offered to help. rrhe doctors decided not to operate on the
gall bladder, and, while Lacy began to close the upper half
of the incision, Eiskamp and Siegal prepared to remove
the mass, which was in the lower left quadrant. None of
Eiskamp 's work was performed in the upper portion of
plaintiff's abdomen, and he left the room before final closure
of the incision. During the operation Lacy and Siegal used
about 18 Kelly clamps which are uncurved scissors-shaped
instruments. Eiskamp did not use anything but curved
clamps. Lacy paid Siegal his fee but never received a bill
from Eiskamp for his services.
Lacy further testified that the surgical nurse keeps a set
of instruments on a tray very close to the surgical field and
that one of her principal functions is to hand instruments
to the doctor and take them back from him. No request for
an instrument count vvas made by Lacy. The practice of
hospitals generally is to maintain a sponge count before
closure of an incision and to account for the needles used
in suturing. This practice is followed by the nurses at
defendant hospital.
Siegal's testimony substantially confirmed that of Lacy
as to the sequence of events in the operating room. He said
that Eiskamp did not take part in closing the upper portion
of the incision and left before final closure of the abdomen.
Eiskamp testified that no Kelly clamps were used in his
part of the operation, that he "had nothing to do with the
gall bladder" and that in order to speed the operation he
worked with Siegal on the tumor in the lower left quadrant
of the abdomen.
47 C.2d-17

strument
and needles are
is made if requested by the surgeon.
[1] When a foreign object is
left in a
patient's abdomen it is ordinarily the result of the
of someone. (Ales v. Ryan, 8 Cal.2d 82
P.2d 409].)
And where a patient receives unusual
while unconscious, all of the persons who had any control over his
body or the instrumentalities which might have caused the
injuries may properly be called upon to meet the inference
of negligence by giving an explanation of their conduct.
(Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal.2d 486 [154 P.2d 687, 162 A.L.R.
1258].) The evidence is sufficient to rmse an inference
of negligence under the doctrine of res
as to
Eiskamp, Pogatschnik and the
assisted
in the operation; at one time or another during the operation
the control of the instrument left in plaintiff's
was in
the hands of the nurse; the hospital
the nurse and
furnished and reassembled the instruments. This places upon
them the burden of initial
supra.)

Plaintiff contends that the inference of res
loquitur
was not dispelled as a matter of law and that therefore the
court erred in granting the motion for a nonsuit. [2] The
same test is applicable in determining when the res
loquitur inference is dispelled as a matter of law as in deciding
when any other inference is conclusively rebutted. (See
Rose v. Melody Lane, 39 Cal.2d
487 [247 P.2d 335] ;
Lcet v. Union Pac. R. R. Co., 25 Cal.2d 605, 621-622 [155
P .2d
158 A.L.R. 1008].) [3] It has long been the rule
in this state that a nonsuit may be granted only when, disregarding conflicting evidence, giving to the plaintiff's evidence all the value to which it is legally entitled, and indulging
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as a matter of
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the inference
of res
as a matter of law was elicited from
witnesses called under section 2055 of the Code of Civil Proand
contends that such evidence cannot be
an inference on which
Section 2055
in effect that a party
to a civil action may be examined as if under cross-examination
by the adverse
and that the party examining such
witness shall not be bound by the witness' testimony and
may rebut it
other evidence. Before section 2055 was
a
who called an adverse party to testify
found that the witness >Yas treated as his own and that his
2
Section 2055 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: ''A party to
the record of any civil action or proceeding or
person for whose
immediate benefit such action
is prosecuted or defended,
or the directors, officers,
member, agent, employee, or
or person, or the agent, officer or
of any
a municipal
which is a party t0 the action or
be
the adverse
as if under crossto
examination of other
witnesses.
witness shall not be bound
his testimon;-,
glven },y such witness may be rehutted hy the party
him for snch examination hy other evidence.
Such
when so
be examined by his own counsel, hut
matters
on such examination.''

0.2d

examination was
to direct
examination. (See Smcllie Southcm Pac.
212 Cal. 540,
555 [299 P. 529] .) [5] This rule
by section
2055 so that
elicited
a
under this section
of his mvn witnesses bnt as testimony obtained
of the defendant's
witnesses.
212 Cal. 540, 556
782
P. 425,
[299 P. 529] ;
15 A.hR. 192].) [6] It is clear, lwwever, that all such
testimony is evidence in the ease and that the
m
the section that a party
au ar\yerse witness shaH not
be bound by his
does not mean that snch
may not be giwn its proper
declares, that the party
concluded from
or from impeaching
tho witness."
184 Cal. 775, 782 r195 P.
425, 15 A.hH. 192] ; flOC Smcllie V. Southern rae.
212 Cal.
540, 559 [299 P. 529] ; Dempsey v. Star IImtsc
Inc.,
2 Cal.App.2d 720, 722 [38 P.2t1
; 1:3 Cal.Tdlev. 302. 3 )
[7a] It has been squarely held that an infrrence upon
which a plaintiff relies may be completely dispelled as a
matter of law by evidence givm by witnesses called under
section 2055. ( Cnmch v. Gilmore Oil
Ltd., 5 Cal.2d 330
[54 P.2d 709] .) In the Crouch ease an inference that one
Smith was an agent of defendant arose from proof of the
fact that the defendant's aclvertising insignia was painted
on trucks operated by Smith. Evidence >vas adduced under
section 2055 ·which the court found
the inference
as a matter of law, and it was held that a nonsuit was proper.
Our decision in Crowe v. McBride, 25 Cal.2d 318 [153 P.2d
727], is not inconsistent with the holding in the Crouch
ease. As will be seen from an rxamination of the opinion
in C1'0We v. 111cBricle, the
involved was whether the
evidence was sufficient to present a question for the trier of
fact, and in this connection we held that the testimony of the
defendant given pursuant to an examination under section
2055 was evidence in the ease and could be used to establish a
cause of action against him. The use of evidence elicited
3
ln an article entitled "Some Recent Cases in
' 13 Cal.
L.Rcv. 285, 302 (192fi), Professor A. M. Kid1l, in
on section 2055, said: ''The section states that n
ealling
ndversc
party slwll not be hound by his testimony, ns
were ever lJOund
by the testimony of any witness. ·what was
was tlwt an adverse
party called as a witness might he examined nnd impeached to the same

extent as the ordinary witness.''
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inference was not involved.
relies upon the following language m
sttpra: ''In considering the propriety of
the evidence most favorable to
the nonsuit, we must
that which is unfavorable. The testiand
mony of the u<J.Lc.uuau who was called to
under secfalls within this
tion
the Code of Civil
evidence in the case insofar as it
is favorable to
This
must, of course,
of the facts of the case and the question
be read in the
nPr«u>ntr>ci for determination.
It is correct as a general propand it should not be
a strained interpretation to reach
conclusion on a matter not presented to or
considered by the court.
Cases involving the use of evidence adduced under section
must be distinguished from
2055 to dispel a
[8]
speaking, it may
those
is dispelled as a matter of law
only when a fact which is wholly irreconcilable with it is
proved by the uncontradicted testimony of the party relying
on 1:t or of such
own witnesses. 4 (Mar Shee v. Maryland Assttr. Corp., 190 Cal. 1, 9 [210 P. 269] ; Steward v.
Paige, 90 Cal.App.2d
825 [20:3 P.2d 858] ; see Chakmakjian v. Lowe, 33 Cal.2d 308, 313 [201 P.2d 801] ; Engstrom v. Attburn Auto. Sales Corp., 11 Cal.2d 64, 70 [77 P.2d
1059] ; Smellie v. Southern Pac. Co., 212 Cal. 540, 552 [299
P. 529]; cf.
v.
8 Cal.2d 294, 296 [65 P.2d
65]; Levin v. Brown, 81 Cal.App.2d 913, 917 [185 P.2d 329] .)
[9] Accordingly, it is the general rule that a p1·es1mtption
favorable to a plaintiff cannot be so dispelled by the testimony of a defendant given pursuant to section 2055 because
a defendant called under that section is not treated as the
plaintiff's witness. (Smellie v. Southern Pac. Co., 212 Cal.
540, 559 [299 P. 529]; Lopez v. ][night, 121 Cal.App.2d 387,
390-391 [263 P.2d 452] ; Green v. Uarte, 87 Cal.App.2d 75,
'There is a recognized exception to the general rule where evidence
of the opposite party is absolutely conclusive, as for instance, where the
presumption of death of a person who has not been heard from in
seven years is dispelled
of the person in court. (See
,.. Auburn Auto.
Corp., 11 Cal.2d 64, 70 [77 P.2d 1079];
v. Smlthcrn Pac. Co., 213 Cal. 540, 552 [299 P. 529].) The
general rule also is subject to the qualification that where testimony of
the party relying on a presumption or of his witnesses is the product of
mistake or inadvertence, such testimony will not operate to dispel the
presumption. (See Mar Shee v. Maryland Assur. Corp., 190 Cal. 1, 9
[210 P. 269].)

because she was unconscious
treatment that resulted in her
lS
of a liberalized test for res
and all persons who
had any control over her
or the instrumentalities which
have caused her
meet the inan
of their conferenee of
dnet. [10] If in these circumstances evideuee
witnesses under section 2055 establishes as a matter of law that
one of the defendants is free from
the
facie
case against that defendant based on the inference should
fall, and plaintiff's position with
to that defendant
should be the same as if she had failed to prove all the facts
necessary to raise the inference.
[11] A witness may, of course, be disbelieved if there is
any rational ground for
so, and the interest of a
in the result of a case will m some circumstances justify
the trier of fact in
his
Hamilton v. Abadjian, 30
53 [179 P.2d
v. Reis, 21 Cal.2d
659-661
P.2d
,
Coffin, 20 Cal.2d
461-462 [126 P.2d 868].) There are
where the interest of a
in
a judgment favorable to himself will not render all of his
testimony subject to disbelief. For
where part of
a defendant's
is harmful to him but favorable to
a
as where it tends to show that the witness il"
liable or makes it more difficult for him to establish his own
lack of fault, that portion of his
may be used to
rebut an inference unfavorable to the codefendant provided
there is
to indicate collusion or any other reason for
disbelieving the testimony.
[12] The evidence as to Eiskamp 's participation in the
operation consisted of the testimony of Lacy, Siegal and
Eiskamp, and it was clear and uncontradicted to the effect
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absolve them
and
in view
a favorable
interest in the outcome of the case. She
had an interest in the
as to the nurse because the
as employer, would be liable for acts of
the nurse within the scope of ht>r employment. Craig's testimony could therefore be disbelieved by the trier of fact. (See
Hamilton v.
30 Cal.2d 49, 53 [179 P.2d 804]; Hickg
v. Rm:s, 21 Ca1.2d 654. 659-661 f134 P.2d 788] ; Blank v.
Co/fin, 20 Cal.2d
461-462 [126 P.2d 868] .)
[14]
's testimony were accepted by thr
trier of fact as
it is not of the character required
to
the inference of negligence raised
the hospital
and the nurse. As we l1ave seen, Craig testified that it was
the practice of
in the area to count sponges and
needles as
of the operative procedure, and with respect
to "other
" she stated there was "no established
practice of instrument
either before or after surgery.'' Even if we assume she intended to say that it was the
11of to eount instruments, this evidenee would not
conclusively establish that the hospital and nurse were free
from
These defendants seek to avoid liability
on the
that
were required to exercise only that
of skill
other hospitals and nurses in the
[15] It is matter of c•ommon knowledge, howskill is
m
instruments.
lmdPr sueh eircumstanees
of practice
or
evidence of what should be done and may
assist in the detrrmination of what eonstitntes dne eare, it
does not
0Rtablish tlH' standard of earn.
Alvs
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v. Ryan, 8 Cal.2d
100
; Barham v.
210 Cal. 206, 216 [291 P.
; Anderson
.App.2d 761, 765 [109 P.2d
; Indcrbitzen v. Lane
Hospital, 124 CaL.App. 462, 467
P.2d 744, 13 P.2d 905] .)
[17] "General
cannot be excused on
that others in the same
the same kind of
gence."
v. Ryan, 8
100
P.2d 409].)
[18] \Ve cannot say as a matter of
duty on the part of the
ment count in order to assist the
from the
whether all instruments used had
patient before final closure.
defendant
and is
The judgment is affirmed
and \Vatsonville Comreversed as to defendants
munity Hospital.
Traynor, J., Schauer, ,J.,
concurred.

., and McComb,

CARTER, J.-Concnrring and Disscnting.-The holding
of the majority opinion may be epitomized as follows : .An
inference of negligence which arises from testimony of adverse witnesses examined under section 2055 of the Code
of Civil Procedure may be dispelled by such testimony
even though plaintiff is not bound thereby and is entitled
to rely upon all of such
which is fayorable to her
and disregard all that is unfavorable. 'l'he unsoundness of
this holding is so obvious that the mere statement of it
should disclose its absurdity. It is not
directly in
confliet with the statutory law of this state (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 2055) but countless decisions of this court and of the
appellate courts of the state. It is sheer double talk to say
that evidence which is r~ot
upon a
may be relied
upon to repel or dispel other evidence-an inference-in
favor of such party.
Section 2055 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that
".A party to the record of any civil action or proceeding or
a person for whose immediate benefit such action or proceeding
is prosecuted or defended . . . may be examined by the
adverse party as if under cross-examination, subject to the
rules applicable to the examination of other witnesses. The
party calling s1wh a<.:Zvcrse witness shall not be bound by his
testimony, and the testirnony
by sueh witness may be
rebtdted by the party calll:ng h,irn for such examination by
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added.) After noting that
case at bar were whether an
raised under the doctrine of
res ipsa
if such an inference arose,
it was dispelled as a matter of law, we find this statement
in the majority opinion:
''Evelyn
vvho was superintendent of the hospital,
and defendants
and Eiskamp were called by
plaintiff to testify under section 2055 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, which
that in a civil action a party may
call and examine an aclver·sc witness." (Emphasis added.)
Section 2055 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides a great
deal more than the above quoted misleading statement would
lead one to believe. In discussing the effect of section 2055,
the following statement from the majority opinion is of
interest: ''Section 2055 provides in effect that a party to a
civil action may be examined as if under cross-examination
by the adverse party and that the party examining such
witness shall not be bound by the witness' testimony and
may rebut it by other evidence. Before section 2055 was
enacted, a litigant who called an adverse party to testify
found that the witness was treated as his own and that his
examination was restricted by the rules applicable to direct
examination. (See Smcllic v. Southern Pac. Co., 212 Cal.
540, 555 [299 P. 529].) rrhis rule was changed by section
2055 so that testimony elicited by a plaintiff under this
section is not treated as testimony of his own witness but
as testimony obtained under cross-examination of the defendant's witnesses. (Smcllie v. Southern Pac. Co., 212 Cal.
540, 556 [299 P. 529]; li'igari v. Olcese, 184 Cal. 775, 782 [195
P. 425, 15 A.I.1.n. 192].)" 'l'he just quoted excerpt from
the majority is more than misleading-and the cases cited
do not stand for the proposition for which they are cited.
1<-,or illustration, in the Smellie case, supra, at page 556, we
find this court stating that section 2055 ''is a statute remedial in character, and as such should receive a construction
by the courts ·which will carry into effect and accomplish the
intent and purpose of the legislature in enacting it. This
intent was, as we read the section, to enable a party to an
action to call an adverse party as a witness for the purpose
of eliciting such
as said witness may testify to which
are favorable to the party calling him, without being bound
by any ad1Jcrse testimony which said witness may give. Only
by such construction can the full remedial purposes of said

other
the

1erms

of said section
was the purpose of the
section. As before

a
eross-examination'
bound
his
more direct and
case, a trial on the merits
directed verdict. In the
was involved and the court there held that '' 1'his
may
be
its proper weight, but
as it
that the party
calling such witness shall not be concluded from
his testimony, or from
the witness.
Fabel, 132 U.S. 487 [33 L.Ed. 421, 10 S.Ct.
Rose's U.S. Notes].)" In Daniels v. City &
Francisco, 40 Cal.2d 614, 625
P.2d
,
of this court specifically held that "Plaintiffs maintain that
'the instruction should have explained that any such
elicited by the plaintiffs should weigh for them insofar as it
was favorable, but that it should be disregarded insofar as it
was ~mfavorable, if the matters to which it referred were not
satisfactorily established by other evidence.' (Emphasis added.) But plaintiffs are relying upon authorities involving
rulings upon a motion either for a nonsuit (jl;Jarchetti v. Southern Pac. Co., 204 Cal. 679, 686 [269 P. 529] ; Dempsey v. Star
House Movers, Inc., 2 Cal.App.2d 720, 722
P.2d 825])
or for a directed verdict (Smellie v. Sotdhent Pac. Co., 212
Cal. 540, 556 [299 P. 529] ; People v. Mahoney, 13 Cal.2d 729,
736 [91 P.2d 1029] ). The rules therein stated have no
application upon submission of the case for a determination
of the factual issues on the merits.
v. Olcese, 184
Cal. 775, 782 [195 P. 425, 15 A.L.R. 192]; Darn v. Pichinino,
105 Cal.App.2d 796, 800 [234 P.2d 307] .) The distinction
is noted in the Smellie case, where, after a full discussion, it
is stated that testimony elicited under section 2055 'is, of
rourse, evidence in the case and may be considered in determining the issues of the case upon the trial or final hearing
by the court, or if the case is before a jury,
the jury.'
(212 Cal. 559; see, also, Green v.
136 Cal.App.
32, 37-38 [28 P.2d 395]; Balasco v. Chick, 84 Cal.App.2d
802, 808 [192 P.2d 76].) Since this case was submitted to
the jury on the merits, the assailed instruction was proper.
(Joseph v. Vogt, 35 Cal.App.2d 439, 441 [95 P.2d 947];
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as a matter of
1'he motion for nonsuit should have been denied.
204 CaL 679
P.
order
a nonsuit.
member of this court
at one time or another,
relied upon and stated the rule of law applicable when a
motion for a nonsuit is made : '' '.l\.. motion for nonsuit may
be
and only when, disregarding
to plaintiff's evidence all the
value to which it is
entitled, indulging in every
inference which may be drawn from that evidence,
the result is a determination that there is no evidence of
sufficient substantiality to support a verdict in favor of the
plaintiff." . . . "Unless it can be said as a matter of law,
that ... no other reasonable conclusion is legally deducible
from the
and that any other holding would be so
support that a reviewing court would
he impelled to reverse it upon appeal, or the trial court to
set it aside as a matter of law, the trial court is not justified
in taking the case from the jury." .. .' " (Seneris v. Haas,
45 Ca1.2d 811, 821 [291 P.2d 915]; Carter, J.) In H•inds v.
l>Fh
19 Ca1.2d
460 [121 P.2d 724 l, Mr. Chief
,Justice Gibson in speaking for the court, said: "Where a
is rendered upon a motion for nonsuit, the court
must assume that all evidence received in favor of the plaintiff
relevant to the issues is true. All p1·esurnptions, 'inferences
ancl doubtful questions must be construed most favorably to
the
. . . In such
ipsa loquitur] cases an inference arises that the accident resulted from a want of
proper care on the part of the defendants. . . . It is incumbent upon the defendant in such a case to bring forth
evidence to rebut the inference of negligence, and under
such circumstances a nonsuit is improper since the case
;;;honlil be snbmittrd tn the jury." (Emphasis added.) Mr.

Justice Shenk,
for
in Jlilana v. Credit
Discount Co., 27 Cal.2d 336
165 A.L.R. 621],
approved and relied upon the rule; in
v. Sugarman,
36 Cal.2d 152 [222 P.2d 665], and
36 Cal.2d
654 [226 P.2d 574], Mr. ,Justice
speaking for the
court, approved and relied upon the rule; in Easton v. Ash,
18 Cal.2d 530 [116 P.2d
, Mr. ,Justice
, speaking
for the court, approved and relied upon the rule; in Palmquist
v. ·JJ1ercer, 43 Cal.2d 92, 95
P.2d
, Mr. Justice Spence,
speaking for the court, approved and relied upon the rule;
in Aguirre v. City of Los
46 Cal.2d 841 [299 P.2d
862], Mr. Justice McComb,
the court, approved
and relied upon the rule.
The above stated rule has been so firmly embedded in
the law of this state, that I find it incomprehensible that a
majority of the members of this eonrt should fail to realize
that the above cases, and those following (to cite but a very
few) will be overruled sub silento! (For statements and
restatements of the rule, see: Schanfele v. Doyle (1890), 86
Cal. 107 [24 P. 834]; ATchibalcl Estate v. Matteson (1907), 5
Cal.App. 441 [90 P. 723]; IIerctdes Oil etc. Co. v. Hocknell
(1907), 5 Cal.App. 702 [91 P. 341]; Leitch v. JJiarx (1913),
21 Cal.App. 208 [131 P. 328] ; Jh?dew v. Shattuck & Nimmo
W. Co. (1918), 39 Cal.App. 42 [J77 P. 866]; Scott v. Sciaroni
(1924), 66 Cal.App. 577
P. 827]; Dawson v. Tttlare Union
High Sch. (1929), 98 Cal.App. 138 [276 P. 424]; Nicholas v.
Jacobson (1931), 113 Cal.App. 382 [298 P. 505]; Green v.
Newmark (1933), 136 Cal.App. 32
P.2d 395]; Cash v. Los
Angeles Ry. Corp. (1935), 6 Cal.App.2d 738 [45 P.2d 280];
Estate of Cnshing (1939), 30 Cal.App.2<l 340 [86 P.2d 375] ;
Knecht v. Lombardo (1939), 33 Cal.App.2d 447 [91 P.2d 917];
Kersten v. Young (1942), 52
1 [125 P.2d 501];
Estate of Rabinowitz (1948). 48 Cal.App.2d 106 [135 P.2d
579]; JJiacDonalcl v. Jackson (1953), 117 Cal.App.2d 598 [256
P.2d 591]; Sanders v. MacFarlane's Candies (1953), 119
Cal.App.2d 497 [259 P.2d 1010]; Lehman v. Richfield Oil
Corp. (1953), 121 Cal.App.2d 261 [263 P.2d 13]; and, more
recently, Palmq1rist v. Mercer, 48 Cal.2d 92 [272 P.2d 26];
Dunn v. Pacific Gas & Elec.
43 Cal.2d 265 [272 P.2d 745];
JJicBricle v. Atchison, T. & S. F.
44 Cal.2d 113 [279
P.2d 966]; Warner v. Santa Catalina Island Co., 44 Cal.2d
310 [282 P.2d 121 ; IIUyar v. Union Ice
4fi Cal.2d 30 [286
P.2d 21] ; Raymond v. Indepcudcut
Inc., 133 Cal.
App.2d 154 [284 P.2d ;)7] ; Hale v.
Stm'es, Inc., 129
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v. Rabing, 110
City & County of
[251 P.2d 687] ; Turner
109 [254 P.2d 970] ;
643 [272 P.2d 922]; Weber v.
123 Cal.App.2d 328 [266
126 Cal.App.2d 245 [272
601 [284 P.2d 856] ;
120 Cal.App.2d 537 [261 P.2d 553] ;
Cal.2d 854
P.2d 550] ; Denbo v.
153 [245 P.2d 650] ; Estate of
P.2d 984]; Howard v. General Pe25 [238 P.2d 145]; Hellar v.
424 [244 P.2d 757, 28 A.L.R.2d 1451] ;
115 Cal.App.2d 735 [252 P.2d 751];
117 Cal..App.2d 376 [255 P.2d 456]; MacDonald v.
117 Cal.App.2d 598 [256 P.2d 591] ; Marino v. Valenti, 118 Cal.App.2d 830 [259 P.2d 84] ; Refinite
Sales Co. v. Freel R. Bright Co., 119 Cal.App.2d 56 [258 P.2d
1116]; Warren v.
127 Cal.App.2d 224 [273 P.2d 569].)
In the case under consideration an inference of negligence
arose because of the proved fact that a foreign body, a Kelly
clamp, was left in plaintiff's abdomen after she had undergone surgery performed by defendants in defendant hospital.
'rhe clamp was not there prior to the surgery. That fact
was proved by
taken prior to the time the surgery
was undertaken. In Seneris v. Haas, 45 Cal.2d 811, 825 [291
P.2d 915], we
quoting from Ybarra v. Spangard, 25
Cal.2d 486, 491, 492 [154 P.2d 687, 162 A.L.R. 1258], that
''Every defendant in whose custody the plaintiff was placed
for any period was bound to exercise ordinary care to see that
no unnecessary harm came to him and each would be liable for
failure in this regard.'' We also said ( 45 Cal.2d at p. 826)
that "where a plaintiff receives unusual injuries while unconscious and in the course of medical treatment, all those
defendants 1vho had any control over his body or the instrumentalities which
have caused the injuries may properly
be callecl upon f o meet the
of negligence by giving
an explanation of their conduct." (Emphasis added.) In
Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal.2d 80, 86, 87 [199 P.2d 1, 5 A.L.R.2d
91], speaking of an analogous situation, we said that "a
patient injured while nnconscious on an operating table in
a hospital could hold all or any of the persons who had any
connection with the operation even though he could not select

'' In the Ybarra case
decision therein was that
he had
evidence which gave
of
which was the wr<>vim
that it was then up to the
the
Plaintiff here
and
that Drs.
Nurse Pogatschnik and the Watsonville
Hospital had control of her unconscious person
dominal surgery; that during that surgery a
a foreign object-was left in her abdomen ""'ll""'""
suffering and injury.
proved that
of negligence arose and the duty llllHleuHu"''-'
the defendants to rebut that inference of
or be~
come liable to plaintiff in damages. In order to rebut the inference of negligence, the defendants must make ''an affirma~
tive showing of a definite cause for the
in which
cause no element of negligence on the part of the defendant
adheres, or of such care in all possible
as "'"''""""a."
to lead to the conclusion that the accident could not have
pened from want of care, but must have been due to some
unpreventable cause, although the exact cause is unknown."
(Dierman v. Providence Hospital, 31 Oal.2d 290, 295 [188
P.2d 12].)
In Scott v. Burke, 39 Cal.2d 388 [247 P.2d 313], this court
adopted the holding of Ales v. Ryan, 8
99
P.2d
409], that "the inference of negligence which is created by
the rule res ipsa loqttitttr is in
evidence which may not
be disregarded by the jury and which in the absence of any
other evidence as to negligence, necessitates ·a verdict in favor
the plaintiff." (Emphasis added.)
The majority admits, as necessarily it must, that the res
ipsa loquitur rule is applicable here and that an inference
of negligence arose as to an these defendants. Despite this
admission, the majority holds that evidence elicited under
section 2055 of the Code of Civil Procedure may be considered
and used to dispel the inference of negligence which arose as
to Dr. Eiskamp.
In so holding, the author of the majority opinion ignores
the full impact of the rule set forth in the case of Crowe
v. McBride, 25 Oal.2d 318, 319 [153 P.2d 727], in which he,
speaking for this court, said : ''In considering the propriety
of the nonsuit, we must accept the evidence most favorable
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added.) It has been said time and time
well established that on appeal from
the
has a right to
on such ""m·nr:'""
elicited under section 2055
un•nrnnl'"'' to her and to diswnrn"''"'"
thereof. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 2055; Crowe v. McBride, sup1·a; J[arstensen v. Western
93 Cal.App.2d 435 [209 P.2d 47] ; Williams v.
35
104 [94 P.2d 817] ; Young v. Bank
95 Ca1App.2d 725 [214 P.2d 106, 16 A.hR.2d
; Connors v. Southern Pac. Co., 91 Cal.App.2d 872 [206
; Green v.
87 Cal.App.2d
77 [196 P.2d 63] ;
Carlton v. Pac1>jic Coast Gasoline Co., 110 CaLApp.2d 177
[242 P.2d 391] ; Mm·ino v. Valenti, 118 CaLApp.2d 830 [259
P.2d
Lopez v. Knight, 121 CaLApp.2d 387 [263 P.2d
; Refinite Sales Co. v. Fred R. Bright Co., 119 CaLApp.
2d 56 [258 P.2d 1116] ; Estate of Hull, 63 CaLApp.2d 135
P.2d
; Estate of Burns, 26 CalApp.2d 741 [80
P.2d
; Hiner v. Olson, 23 Cal.App.2d 227 [72 P.2d 890,
73 P.2d 945] ; Whicker v. Crescent Atdo Co., 20 CaLApp.2d
240 [66 P.2d 749]; Estate of Lances, 216 CaL 397 [14 P.2d
7681 ; Lewis v. Southern Calif. Edison Co., 116 Cal.App. 44
P.2d
, and others too numerous to mention.)
We are now told that it has been "squarely held that an
inference upon which a plaintiff relies may be completely dispf'lled as a matter of law by evidence given by witnesses
railed under section 2055. ( Crottch v. G1'lmore Oil Co., Ltd.,
5 Ca1.2d
333
P .2d 709] . ) "
In Crouch v. Gilmore Oil Co., Ltd., supra, an appeal from
a
of nonsuit was involved. Plaintiff there sought
to establish the issue of agency by defendant's testimony
under section 2055. Plaintiff proved that the truck in queswhile different in construction from that used by Gilmore
, was
Gilmore Oil with the r•olors used

the rnle
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by it and 4,500 of its service station
on the Pacific
Coast. Gilmore Oil also
the sides of the truck with
the word ''Gilmore'' and
its
insignia of
the lion's head on the rear of the truck. On the doors of the
truck were, however, painted the words ''Owens Valley Oil
Company.'' Gilmore Oil sold Smith, the owner of the truck,
its gasoline at a lower
Testimony elicited under section
2055 showed that the driver of the truck was
by Smith,
the owner. The court held,
on the
of
Maupin v. Solomon, 41 Cal.App.
P. 198], that the
inference of agency was rebutted
uncontradicted testimony
given under section 2055.
Mattpin v. Solomon, sttpra, involved an appeal from a judgment for the plaintiff after a trial on the
ancl the
court held, merely, that an inference that the driver of defendant's car was acting within the scope of his employment
could not stand in the face of uncontradicted evidence to the
contrary. Testimony adchwecl under section 2055 was not
involved and it was not an appeal from either a nonsuit or a
directed verdict.
It is my opinion that the Crouch case was incorrectly decided. The evidence on the issue of agency was sufficiently
conflicting to make it a question of fact for the jury. Plaintiff
was not bound by the testimony under section 2055 ·which
was contrary to the inference arising from the facts above
set forth. Furthermore, I do not see how Mr. Chief .Justice
Gibson can cite, with approval, the Crouch case in view of
his opinion in Crowe v. JJicBride, 25 Ca1.2d 318, 319 [153
P.2d 727],* wherein he said, in spraking for the court: "In
considering the propriety of the nonsuit, we must accept the
evidence most favorable to plaintiffs and disregard that which
is unfavorable. The testimony of the
who was
called to testify under sect?'on 205:! of the Code of Civil
Procedure, falls within this rt1le and is to be treated as evidence in the case 1:nsofar as H is favorable to plaintiffs."
(Emphasis added.) It wonlc1 appear that the Crouch case
was effectively overruled for all purposes by Crowe v. McBride, sttpra, and the many other brtter reasoned cases both
prior and subsequent thereto. In his analysis of Crowe v.
McBt·ide, sttpra, the author of the majority opinion conveniently omits any mention of the case of Bnrr v. Shcrwt'n
Williams Co., 42 Cal.2d 682, 688, 691
P.2d 1041], where*Even though he maintains it is not i11consistent.
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in he, speaking for the court, said ''It is
of course,
that res ipsa loquitur raises an inference, not a presumption,
and the general rule is that whether a
inference
shall be drawn is a question of fact for the
, even in the
absence of evidence to the contrary. (See Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1958; Blank v. Coffin, 20 Ca1.2d
461
P.2d 8G8] ;
Hamilton v. Pacific EZcc. Ry.
J2 Cal.2d
G02-603 [86
P.2d 829] .) This,
docs not
the conclusion
that 1·cs ipsa logu.iltl1. may
rise to a
kind of
ference which the defendant mnst
fl,c
of the inference is somewhat a76n to
(Emphasis added.)
Also in his endeavor to distiJJgnish the Crowe v. McBride
case from the Crouch case (to the detriment of the Crowe
case), the author of the majority opinion informs us that
the quotation from the Crowe ease "must, of conrsr, be read
in the light of the facts of the case and the question presrnted
for determination. It is correct as a general proposition.
and it should not be given a strained interpretation to reaeh
a conclusion on a matter not presentec1 to or considered by
the court.'' Thi:'l statement is grossly inaccurate. Crowe v.
McBride involved an action for malpractire; defendant chiropractor's motion for a nonsuit was granted. 'l'he appeal >Yas
from the order granting the nonsuit. Defendant's testimony
under 2055 was treated as evidenee in the ease
ag if
was favorable to plah?tiffs and \Ye r0n•rsrd the jmlgment of
nonsuit. It waR, therefore, not ncerssary to give t}JC 1angnage
used there ''a strained interpretation to reach a eonclnsion on
a matter not presented to or considered by the court.''
The majority opinion makes mnch of the faet that the
doctrine of res ipi'la loquitur raises an inferrnre rather than
a presumption and that a presumption may not be dispelle<l
by evidence produced by an adYerse party, \Yhercas an inference may be flO di:'lpellrd. In Bu1T v. Shcnnin W-ill?'arns
Co., S1l]Jra, the author of this opinion sp<'cifieally held that
the doctrine of res ipsa loqnitnr gaYe rise to a ''special kind of
inference" which the defendant must rebut and that the
effect of this particular inference wai'l ''somewhat akin to that
of a presumption'' !
The law in this i'ltate has, nntiJ the ease at bar, always been
that on a motion for a nonsuit a1l eYidrnce elicitrd nnder
section 2055 which is unfayorablc to the plaintiff must be
disregarded. (Green Y. Uartc, 87 Cal.App.2d 75 rl% P.2d
63]; Jep1Ji v. Brockman Holding Co., 3,1 CaL2d 11 [206 P.2d

res
a character that is ''akin
involved
inference that defendant truck
driver was
of Gilmore Oil
It appears to me that the
has
confused the issue. It
the inference of
therein that

as it ·is
remains in the case until rebutted by the dethe time-honored rule where an appeal
of nonsuit is involved; it makes misleading
statements and cites cases in support thereof which are not
As another example, the statement in the majority
that ''The same test is applicable in determining
wh0n t1w
inference is
as a matter
of law as in
when any other inference is conclusively
r0bntted.
Rose v.
39 Cal.2d 481, 487
P.2d
Lcrd v. Union Pac. R. R.
25 Cal.2d 605,
621-622 [J 55 P.2d
158 A.L.R. 1008].)" This follows the
statement of
contention that the inference of res
was not dispelled as a matter of law and that
therefore thr court erred in
the motion for a nons1t1·t.
Both the Rose and I;eet cases were appeals from judgments
rendered
a trial on the merits. NPither one involved
a judgment of nonsuit. Then the author of
makes this statement: "There
howon this broad general rule
rule on
vvher0 nonsuit is
. It is settled that where
the evidence raises an inferencE' that a fact
and either
evidence of
nonexistence of the fact
uncontradict0d and of such a nature
be;
the nonexistence of
matter of law.
Blank
P.2d
.) " Tn Blank v.

dence and may refuse
a
ference can be drawn from certain evidence
but whether the inference shall be
of fact for the
§ 60.)
''
introduces evidence
to the
nonexistence of
and the
must then
determine the existence or nonexistence of the fact from all
the evidence before it. If the evidence
ence of the fact is
positive,
such a nature that it can not
court must instruct the
that the nonexistence of the fact
has been established as a matter of law." It is
that Blank v. Goffin does not stand for the
for
The Blank quotation continues thus: "The
is the sole
of the
of the witnesses (Cal. Code Oiv.
§ 1847; see cases cited in 27
Oal.Jur. 182, § 156) and is free to
them even
are uncontradicted if there is any rational (f'f"flnnn
so.'' The Blank case, incidentally, involved the question of whether or not it was proper for the
to draw
the inference that the automobile was
driven
an
employee of the owner with his
at the time of the
accident. A
of the court m the Blank case held
that the directed verdict was
sufficient evidence "to permit the
was
driven with defendant's
v. Auburn Anto. Sales
J1 Oa1.2d 64
P.2d 1059],
Crouch v. Gilmore Oil Oo., Ltd., supra, and Ceranski v.
60
751 [141 P.2d
, were all cases
involving the inference of ownership. .Johnston v. Black Co.,
33 Cal.App.2d 363 [91 P.2d 921], involved the inference of
res ipsa loquitur and a situation where the trial court had
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directed
verdict for the defendant on the ground of insufticiency of the evidence after the jury had returned a verdict for the plaintiff. The defendants, in the Johnston ease,
had introcluced
at the trial which dispelled the inpages 366 and 368). None of these cases, with
the Crouch case, involved testimony elicited
nncler section 2055 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The
Crouch case has been discussed heretofore.
Plaintiff here has
her injury and defendants' causal
connection therewith, and that inference of negligence remains undispelled until an '' aftirmative showing of a definite
cause for the accident, in which cause no element of negligence on the part of the defendant adheres'' is made. There
is here, therefore, no failure of proof as in the Crouch case.
Plaintiff is not bound by any adverse testimony of any defendant called under 2055. Had the case gone to the jury
it was free to believe that Dr. Eiskamp may have used a Kelly
clamp; that he did, at some time, during the surgery, work
in the upper quadrant of plaintiff's abdomen; or that the
clamp had, during the six months it remained in plaintiff's
abdomen, worked its way to the position in which it was
found. ''. . . the inference of negligence which is created
by the rule res ipsa loqtliitlr is in itself evidence which may
not be disregarded by the jury and which in the absence
of any other evidence as to negligence, necessitates a verdict
in favor of the plaintiff." (Ales v. Ryan, 8 Cal.2d 82, 99
[64 P.2d 409] .) Plaintiff here had made out her case against
all defendants by proving facts which raised an inference of
negligence which remained in the case as evidence until dispelled by the defendants.
The following statement is made in the majority opinion:
''A witness may, of course, be disbelieved if there is any
rational ground for doing so, and the interest of a party,
would in some circumstances justify the trier of fact in
disregarding his testimony. (See Hamilton v. Abadjian,
30 Cal.2d 49, 53 [179 P.2d 804] [nonsuit not involved];
Hicks v. Reis, 21 Cal.2d 654, 659-661 [134 P.2d 788] [nonsuit not involved]; Blank v. Coffin, 20 Cal.2d 457,461-462 [126
P .2d 868] [reversal of directed verdict for defendant].) " It
is, of course, elementary that the trier of fact may, on the
trial of a case, disbelieve any witness or his testimony. We
are here concerned with a nonsuit ( a,nd testimony taken under
section 2055) where all of the plwintifj's evidence and the
inferences to be drawn therefrom mnst be taken as true and
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all conflicts in the evidence must be
Any evidence elicited under section 2055 to the effect that Dr. Eiskamp
did not operate in the field where the
elamp was later
found merely creates a conflict ·with other evidence from
which the evidence of his negligence may be inferred and
must, under heretofore ci.ted cases, be
The following statement from the
is
totally irrelevant where, as here, an
from a judgment of
nonsuit is involved: ''There are situations,
where
the interest of a party in obtaining a jmlgmcnt favorable to
himself will not render all of his testimony subjeet to disbelief. For example, where part of a defendant's testimony
is harmful to hi.m but favorable to a codefendant, as where
it tends to show that the witness is liable or makes it more
difficult for him to establish his own lack of fault, that portion of his testimony may be used to rebut an inference
unfavorable to the codefenrlant provided there is nothing to
indicate collusion or any other reason for disbelieving the
testimony." The q1rcstion of
testimony docs not
enter into the case when a motion for· a nonswit is made. The
defendant, in making the moh"rm, admits that all
plaintiff's
case is tnlC. (People v. One 1940 Buick
71 Oal.App.2d
160 [162 P.2d 318] ; Seaford v. Smith, 86 Oal.App.2d 339 [194
P.2d 792]; Mastro v. Kennedy, 57 Oal.App.2d 499 [134 P.2d
865] ; Moore v. Belt, 34 Cal.2d 525 [212 P.2d
; Connors
v. Smdhern Pac. Co., 91 Cal.App.2d 872 [206 P.2d 31] ;
Karstensen v. ·western Transp. Co., 93 Oal..App.2d 435 [209
P.2d 47] ; Carlton v. Pacific Coast Gasoline Co., 110 Oal.App.
2d 177 [242 P.2d 391]; Baley v. J. F. Hink & Son, 133 Cal.
App.2d 102 [283 P.2d 349] ; New Zealand Ins. Co. v. Brown,
110 Oal.App.2d 411 [242 P.2d 674] ; dcA.J"yan v. Butler,
119 Oal.App.2d 674 [260 P.2d 98] .)
The majority opinion states: ''The evidence as to Eiskamp 's
participation in the operation consisted of the testimony of
T_~acy, Slegal and Eiskamp, and it was elear and uncontradicted
to the effect that Eiskamp was not responsible for
the
clamp in plaintiff's abdomen. This testimony did not in
any way tend to benefit T_~acy or Slcgal bnt, to the rontrary,
was disadvantageous to them because the exoneration of one
defendant ·wonld have the necessary ('ffeet of inereasing the
possibility of liability on the pm·t of Paeh of the other rlefendmlts. The record indicates no ratimml gTonnd for disbelieving their testimony, and we hold that the i11ferenee raised
against Eiskamp under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was

in the

upon which the
statement from

of a witness called
under
section 2060 may be us,;d to
an inference upon which
the
ntiff
the evidence is clear,
uncontradicted and of such a nature that it cannot rationally
It
appropriate to allow such
rebnt the inference in eases like
because she was unconscious
the treatment that resulted in her
of liberalized
for res
persons who hail any control O\'Cr her
strumentalities 1vhielt
have eausecl her injuries are reto meet the inference of negligence
g1vmg an
of their conduct. If in these circumstances evidence
section 20;)5 establishes as a matter of
defendants is free from
the
that defendant based on the inference
's
with
to that clcf'endsame as if she had failed to prove an nw
necessary to raise the inference."
It is
for me to rationalize the
statethe application of' a brand of mental
do not possess. \Vhat I think it means
of Drs.
under the doeirinc of res
rrmaim; in thr caRe until rebutted

as ''a liberalized test for
than liberal to
vvant to do here is
remedial effect of both section 2055 and the
doctrine. It is
this result
eertain
here-"establishes as a matter
of' law that a defendant is free from
" notwiththe law has established an inferenee of
him. Is this the product of rational
ca;ov"'"'"' be so obtuse~ Should such conflicts exist in
our law? l\iy answer to these
is an
NO.
The real difficulty is, the failure of the
process to
function. The majority here desires to reach a result which
cannot be reached by the application of
So
it resorts to sophistry and it becomes enmeshed in a maze
of conflicts. The judicial process operates in reverse order.
It proceeds from the premise that we have a
which
is under attack. To determine the validity of this judgment,
we apply legal tests-rules of law-and we accept the result
which flows from this process. In pursuit of this process, we
avoid conflicts and the law becomes a smoothly operating
machine geared to the efficient administration of
Applying the judicial process to this case, we find that
under section 2055, as construed
all of the authorities,
plaintiff may establish her case by the testimony of adverse
witnesses; she may do this without being bound by any testimony which is unfavorable to her. So far as her case in
chief is concerned, all testimony unfavorable to her must
be disregarded the same as if it were not in the record. The
testimony favorable to her establishes an inference of negligence against all defendants. She may rest her case on such
evidence, secure against a motion for a nonsuit. The judgment
of nonsuit against her was therefore erroneous and should be
reversed. This always has been the law of this state since
section 2055 was enacted and would still be the law if the
judicial process was followed in this case.
It would be just as honest, and do less harm to the law,
if the majority, in order to reach the result it
would
hold that no infere11ce of negligence arose against Dr. Eiskamp
because the undisputed evidence shows that he did not
use a Kelly clamp in the portion of the operation he performed
in plaintiff's abdomen. While I could not join in such holding,
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1s
that
is necessary for a plaintiff to show
that a defendant was an aetive participant in the negligent
aet whieh resulted in the injury complained of in order to
establish an inference of negligence against such defendant
under the res
loquitur doctrine. This was the holding
of this court in Senm·is v. Haas, 45 Cal.2d 811 [291 P.2d 915],
where a judgment of nonsuit in favor of Dr. Haas was affirmed.
But the
holds that under the evidence here
an inference of negligence arose against Dr. Eiskamp and I
agree with this holding. It appears to be the law of this state,
however, that whether a particular inference can be drawn
from certain evidence is a question of law, but whether the
inference shall be drawn, in any given case, is a question of
fact for the jury. (See cases cited in 10 Cal.Jur. 738-739,
§ 60.)
In view of the foregoing rule it would obviously be more
logical for the majority to conclude that under the evidence
produced here no inference of negligence arose against Dr.
Eiskamp. In so holding the majority would have at least
a semblance of authority to support its otherwise wholly
unfounded conclusion.
We have held (Ales v. Ryan, 8 Cal.2d 82, 95, 100 [64 P.2d
409]) that leaving a foreign object in a patient's abdomen
does not ordinarily occur without negligence and in Ybarra
v. Spangard, 25 Cal.2d 486 [154 P.2d 687, 162 A.L.R. 1258],
that when a patient receives unusual injuries while unconscious, all defendants having any control over his body or the
instrumentalities which might have caused the injuries may
be called upon to rebut the inference of negligence by giving
an explanation of their conduct. Nurse Pogatschnik, as an
employee of the hospital, was one of the defendants having
"control" over the unconscious body of the plaintiff. Plaintiff
established through the testimony of Mrs. Evelyn Craig,
superintendent of defendant hospital, who was called under
section 2055, that it was not the practice of the hospital,
through its nurse employees, to make an instrument count
after surgery. vVhether such an omission constituted negligence was answered adversely to defendant hospital in Ales
v. Ryan, 8 Cal.2d 82, 100 [64 P.2d 409], where this court
said: "We have already held upon authority that the failure
to remove a sponge from the abdomen of a patient is negligence of the ordinary type and that it does not involve
knowledge of materia medica surgery but that it belongs to
that class of mental lapses which frequently occur in the usual
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routine of business and commerce, and in the multitude of
affairs which come within the group of ordinary
actionable
The layman needs no scientific enlightenment to see at once that the omission can be accounted
for on no other
than that someone has committed actionable negligence.'' Mrs. Craig also testified, although her
testimony is not
on
creates merely a conflict in the
and may be
that it was not the
custom of
in the
to make an instrument
count after surgery. I am of the opinion that the majority
opnnon
discusses this testimony as failing to
''dispel'' the inference of negligence as to the hospital and
surgical nurse. Plaintiff is not bound by any adverse testimony elicited under section 2055, as I have heretofore pointed
out. The testimony as to custom merely created a conflict
in the evidence and might be considered adverse to plaintiff
if it were not for cases holding that ''General negligence
cannot be excused on the ground that others in the same
locality practice the same kind of negligence." (Ales v. Ryan,
8 Cal.2d 82, 100 [64 P.2d 409] .) It vvas also said in Pattly v.
King, 44 Cal.2d 649, 655 [284 P.2d 487], quoting from Owen
v. Rheem JJ!fg. Co., 83 Cal.App.2d 42, 45 [187 P.2d 785], that
"Custom may assist in the determination of what constitutes
due care. \Vhat others do is some evidence of what should
be done, but custom is never a substitute for due care.''
vVe have repeatedly held that a hospital must exercise
reasonable care towards a patient as his known condition may
require (Wood v. Sarna1·itan Institution, Ine., 26 Cal.2d 847,
851 [161 P.2d 556] ; Riee v. California Lutheran Hospital, 27
Cal.2d 296, 302 [163 P.2d SGO] ; Ault v. Ross General Hospital,
105 Cal.App.2d 78, 80 [232 P.2d 528]). "If the alleged
neglect relates to matters or conduct which are reasonably
within the ken of the average layman the jury may determine
the culpability of the person charged therewith without the
aid of experts. If it relates solely to the exercise of judgment
in the application of skill and learning then proof of the
negligence must be made by experts.'' (Valentin v. La
Societe Francm:se, 76 Cal.App.2d 1, 5 [172 P.2d 359] ; Dean
v. Dyer, 64 Cal.App.2d 646, 653 r149 P.2d 288] ; Stevenson
v. Alta Bates, Inc., 20 Cal.App.2d 303, 309 [66 P.2d 1265];
Inderbitzen v. Lane Hospital, 124 Cal.App. 462 [12 P.2d
744, 13 P.2d 905].) It appears to me that the failure to make
an instrument count
to surgery is a matter "reasonably within the ken'' of the average layman to permit the jury,

failure constituted
reasonable care towards a
as his known
may
(Valentin v. La Societe
1, 5
P.2d 359]; Wood v. Samaritan In26 Cal.2d
851
P.2d 556]). But, the
arisen because of the
in
abdomen
surgery
the defendants had control of her unconscious
of whether such
existed was
of fact on a trial of the issues involved. The
evidence adduced
plaintiff,
with the favorable
inferences to be drawn therefrom, when conflicting evidence
was more than sufficient to permit the cause to
the jury, or the court, as the case may be.
It is
to rationalize the majority opinion on any
of law or logic. It certainly finds no support in the
prior decisions of this court or the appellate courts of this
state. In the absence of any basis in legal philosophy for
the holding
it is obvious that considerations of expediency have controlled. I submit that such considerations
are foreign to the judicial concept. If the law is to be
changed, the Legislature is the law-making body, and such
change should be brought about by legislation and not by
judicial fiat. In our constitutional form of government, with
its system of checks and balances, the Legislature is more
responsive to the will of the people than the courts and any
change in public policy or statutory law should originate
with it. I submit that the action of this court here invades
the province of the Legislature in a most vital field of legislation and public policy as it repeals or nullifies the provision
in section 2055 of the Code of Civil Procedure that a party
is not bound by testimony elicited under this section.
I would reverse the judgments of nonsuit as to defendants
Eiskamp, Pogatschnik and the 'Watsonville Community Hospital.
SHENK, J.-I dissent. I am in agreement with the dissenting opinion of Mr. J nstiee Carter insofar as he concludes
that the majority opinion has misapplied section 2055 of
the Code of Civil Procedure and the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur. It is vH~ll establis1wd by the authorities in this
state and cited
Mr. Justiee Carter that the plaintiff may,
under seetion
eall thr; defendants as adverse witnesses

and
without
bound
that
unfavorable to him
for the purposes of a motion for a
be dishowever
or
or even conclusive it
be in favor of the defendants and
the
in the trial on the merits. The
benefit of whatever
of that
is favorable to
him and that portion only is to be considered in evidence for
the purpose of a nonsuit. For that purpose the
's
all favorable inferences that may be drawn
case is supported
from that testimony. Those inferences may be in addition to
the inference included in the doctrine of res
which alone is sufficient to take the case to trial on the merits.
The question of when an inference in favor of the
may be dispelled by the testimony of his own witnesses is not
involved in this case. In law the defendants, when called by
the plaintiff under section 2055, are not the plaintiff's witnesses. With the rule now announced by the majority a
plaintiff may not call a defendant for examination under that
section except at the peril of having the testimony so taken
and which is unfavorable to him used against him in support
of a motion for a nonsuit. This is an unfortunate and confusing deviation from the established rules. Under the authorities the res ipsa loquitur doctrine is applicable to this
case and its beneficial purpose is effectively destroyed if in
calling the defendants as adverse witnesses the
must
assume the hazard of having them justify their conduct and
by their own testimony obtain a judgment of nonsuit. The
record shows without question that the testimony of the defendants obtained under section 2055 insofar as it is favorable
to the plaintiff is in support of the inference of negligence,
and that inference has not been dispelled either in fact or in
law. The defendant Eiskamp took part in the operation and
he should be required to defend on the merits along with his
codefendants.
The petition of respondents \Vatsonville Community Hospital and Kay Pogatschnik for a rehearing was denied January 16, 1957.

